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Express and Implied Civil Liability Provisions in
State Blue Sky Laws
WITH THE PASSAGE of the principal federal securities legislation
in the decade following the enactment of the Securities Act
of 1933,' state regulation of the offer and sale of securities has been
overshadowed and much overlooked. These state statutes, common-
ly known as "blue sky laws,"2 carry criminal liabilities which can
be quite severe.3 However, enforcement of the blue sky laws is
generally not left to criminal sanctions alone. The typical state
securities law also provides express civil liabilities for violations of
the act so that situations may occur in which an injured buyer could
conceivably select his remedy from those available at common law,
those under the federal acts, or those under the state blue sky laws."
The subject to be considered herein is the civil liability provisions
in state blue sky laws. A consideration of the common law and
federal statutory liabilities is beyond the scope of this treatment.'
Civil liabilities under the state laws can be classified into ex-
press and implied liabilities. Express civil liabilities fall into several
general types. One of the most common is that which is known
as a voidabifity provision. Under such a provision, the buyer's
remedy for violation of the state act is limited to rescission of the
contract of sale and a recovery of the purchase price and in some
cases interest, attorneys' fees, and court costs, depending upon the
provisions of the particular state act. Of the forty-five states which
have some statutory provisions for civil liability resulting from a
securities transaction,' forty-one have a voidability provision of some
kind' with seven of these making voidability the exclusive remedy.8
148 Star. 74, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
2 This term apparently first came into use in Kansas "to describe legislation aimed
at promoters who 'would sell building lots in the blue sky in fee simple."' See 1 Loss,
SEcURIMES REGULATION 27 (1961).
3 For example, the Ohio criminal sanction for a violation of specifically enumerated
duties is imprisonment for one to five years or a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars or both. OHIO REv. CODE § 1707.99.
4 See 3 Loss, op. cit. sapra note 2, at 1623.
5 For a good discussion of these subjects, see 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 2.
6 Delaware has no securities law of any kind. In addition, Idaho, New York, Penn-
sylvania, and Rhode Island do not provide express civil liabilities in their statutory
scheme of securities regulation.
7ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(a) (Supp. 1963); ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220(a)
(1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(a)
(1966); CAL. CORP. CODE § 26100; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-21(1) (1963);
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It is the liability provisions of the thirty-eight states which create
civil liability beyond voidability provisions on which this discussion
will center.9
Also to be reviewed herein are the bonding provisions contained
in most state securities laws. It will be seen that some of these pro-
visions do little more than create a fund out of which judgments
based on other statutory sections may be satisfied. On the other
hand, some bonding provisions seem to create new liability, in-
dependent of other provisions of the securities act or the common
law remedies.
Finally, the applicability of the doctrine of implied liability to
the state blue sky laws will be discussed. There have been many
thorough treatments of the doctrine of implied liability ° and no
consideration in depth will be given to that subject here. However,
what will be examined is the language in some of the state securities
acts which might prevent the application of that doctrine in this area.
I. EXPRESS LIABILITY PROVISIONS
IN STATE BLUE SKY LAWS
In the states which have comprehensive blue sky regulation, two
patterns can be seen in regard to the acts leading to liability. The
first pattern might be referred to as the specific versus general
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-312a(a) (1960); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21 (1962);
GA. CODE ANN. § 97-114 (Supp. 1965); HAWAII REv. LAWs § 199-16 (Supp. 1961);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121V2, § 137.13 (Smith-Hurd 1965); IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-873
(a) (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.23 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268
(a) (1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 292.480(1) (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5
51:715 (1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 34(a) (Supp. 1965); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 110A, § 18 (1947); McH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776 (410) (a) (Supp. 1965); MIss.
CODE ANN. 5 5374 (Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.240 (1952); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. 515-2022 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-347 (1958); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 90.200(1) (Supp. 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-19(a) (Supp. 1965); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 48-18-31 (Supp. 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 78-22 (1965); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 10-04-17 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.43; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
408(a) (1965); ORE. REv. STAT. 5 59.250 (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-309
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. 5 48-1645 (1964); TEX. REV. STAT. ANN. art 581-33
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 61-1-22(1) (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, 5
4225 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
21.20.430(1) (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3273(18) (1961); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
189.18 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-117.22(a) (1965).
S Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Wisconsin.
See note 7 supra, for the code sections.
9 For a discussion of voidability provisions under state securities laws see Note, Void-
ability Provisions Under State Blue Sky Laws, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 1148 (1966).
10 See, e.g., 2 Loss, op. cit. supra, note 2, at 932-46; Shipman, Two Current Ques-
tions Concerning Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority
of the Administrative Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Re-
quirements, 17 W. RES. L. REv. 925 (1966).
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dichotomy.' By this is meant that some of the statutes state that a
violation of "any" of the requirements of the act shall result in
liability" whereas other statutes provide that a failure to comply
with specifically enumerated sections will result in liability." The
significance of this difference is that under the "any" statutes, even a
technical violation of the act, a violation which might have no ef-
fect on the understanding of the buyer, would result in the specified
liability. In some instances, therefore, a buyer who was disappointed
with the financial progress of his security could utilize a technical
violation of the act to rescind the contract at any time within the
limitations period.
Generally, under the statutes which specifically enumerate the
violations which will result in liability, the enumerated acts relate
to the qualifications of the seller, the proper registration of the se-
curity, and other fundamental segments of the transaction. Thus,
in light of the purpose of blue sky legislation, namely, to prevent
fraud and deceit and to protect the investor from buying worthless
securities or a piece of "blue sky," it would seem that the statutes
which specifically enumerate the proscribed acts more nearly ap-
proach the desired result, for the "any" provision type of statute
actually puts the buyer in a more favorable position than the statute
presumably was intended to do.
The second pattern relates to whether liability will arise from
an offer as well as from a sale. Most of the state statutes provide
that any offer or sale in violation of the provisions listed will result
in liability.'" Others provide merely that any sale in violation of
the provisions of the statute is the act for which the seller will be
liable.'4 Admittedly, no liability arises unless the buyer can show
that he was damaged by the seller's violation of the act. At first
blush, therefore, it might seem that, since a sale would ultimately
have to occur in order for a buyer to have been damaged and thus
before any liability would arise, there is no substantial difference be-
tween the results under the different language. However, it is con-
"1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(a) (1) (Supp. 1963); Mo. ANN. STAT.
409.250 (Supp. 1965).
12 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 4 5.55.220(a) (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256
(a) (1966). The Uniform Securities Act has adopted this form. See Uniform Seca-
rides Act § 410(a), found in Loss & Cow=r, BLUE SKY LAw 389 (1958) [herein-
after cited as UNIFORM ACT].
13 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(a) (1) (Supp. 1963); OHIo REv. CODE S
1707A3 (the code states only "sale" or "contract of sale" but the definition of "sale"
includes an offer).
14 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN., § 13.1-522 (1964).
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ceivable that under statutes which proscribe only selling in violation
of the statute, a seller could substantially violate the act while offer-
ing the security for sale but could correct the violation before the
sale was completed and thus escape liability under a strict reading
of the statute. This is a desirable result where the violation was
merely a technical one and did not cause any misunderstanding on
the part of the buyer. But consider the case where the seller ma-
terially misrepresented in the offer of the security, but later and be-
fore the sale corrected the misrepresentation by a printed circular or
in a printed contract of sale which the buyer may or may not have
read. It would seem that although the seller would not have vio-
lated the letter of the law, he would have violated the spirit of the
law, but yet the courts might find him not liable under the statute.
As the statutes are discussed below it will be helpful to keep in
mind which of the patterns is indicated by the statute under dis-
cussion.
A. Uniform Securities Act
(1) Acts Leading to Liability.-The liability provisions of the
Uniform Securities Act have been adopted in twenty states in one
form or another.'5 Under this act, liability is incurred by commit-
ting any one of eight specifically enumerated acts in the offer or sale
of any security covered by the act:' " by offering or selling in violation
of the registration requirements for dealers 7 or securities, 8 by mak-
ing false or misleading statements about the meaning or implications
of proper registration or exemption," by failing to have sales litera-
ture approved before its use,2" by failing to distribute a prospectus to
'
5 ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45 (Supp. 1963); ALAsKA STAT. § 45.55.220 (1962);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256 (1966); CoLo REv. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-21 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-312a (1960); IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-873 (Supp. 1965);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268 (1964); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 292.480 (1963); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 34 (1957); MCH. STAT. ANN. § 19.776(410) (a) (Supp.
1965); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 15-2022 (Supp. 1965); NEv. REV. STAT. §
90.200 (Supp. 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-19 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71, § 408 (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 62-309 to -316 (1962); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 581-33 (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22 (Supp. 1965); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-522 (1964); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430 (1961); Wo.
STAT. ANN. § 17-117.22 (1965).
16 UNIFoRM AcT 410(a) (1).
17UNIFORM AcT 5 201. For a discussion of the registration provisions under the
Ohio Securities Act, see Note, Registration Provisions Under the Ohio Blue Sky Laws,
17 W. RES. L. REv. 1126 (1966).
18 UNiFORM AcT § 301.
19 UNIFORM AcT 5 405 (b).
2 0 UNFORM Acr § 403.
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each offeree,2' by failing to meet the escrow or impounding provi-
sions of the actm or by failing to use the special form of subscription
or sales contract for securities registered by qualification or coordina-
tion.'s Section 410 (a) further provides that offering or selling by
means of untrue statements or by an omission to state a material
fact necessary in the light of the circumstances to not mislead the
buyer also renders the seller liable under the act.24
(2) Defenses to Liability.-Under the Uniform Act, there are
no enumerated defenses that apply specifically to the liabilities
spelled out in section 410 (a) (1). However, the defense of the
statute of limitations would apply to these liabilities as well as the
liability for fraud contained in section 410(a) (2). Section 410(e)
provides that no action shall be commenced under this section more
than two years after the contract of sale. In addition to this time
limitation, section 410(e) contains another defense which appears
to be an affirmative defense. If the plaintiff under this section
failed either to accept within the prescribed time limit an offer of
rescission, properly made, at a time when he owned the securities or
to reject within the prescribed time limit an offer of rescission, pro-
perly made, when he no longer owned the securities, he will be un-
able to bring an action under this section of the Uniform Act.25
Thus, a buyer cannot unduly profit by the seller's error if this error
is brought to the attention of the buyer through an offer of rescission
by the seller. Without this provision, it would seem that a buyer
could ignore the seller's offer and wait to see how his acquisition
was going to fare. Then if the securities did not within two years
make enough financial progress to satisfy the buyer, he could file
his action either for rescission or for damages if he sold the securi-
ties. However, with this provision, such an advantageous position
for the buyer would arise only where he knows of the violation and
2 1 UNIFORM ACT §304(d).
22 UNIFORm Ac 5 305 (g).
2 3 UNFORM ACT § 305 (h).
2 4 UNFoRM Acr § 410(a) (2). This provision is based upon § 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 771(2) (1964).
25 Section 410 (e) states, in pertinent part:
No person may sue under this section (1) if the buyer received a written
offer, before 'suit and at a time when he owned the security, to refund the con-
sideration paid together with interest at six percent per year from the date of
payment, less the amount of any income received on the security, and he failed
to accept the offer within thirty days of its receipt, or (2) if the buyer received
such an offer before suit and at a time when he did not own the security, unless
he rejected the offer in writing within thirty days of its receipt.
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the seller either does not know of the violation or does not make
an offer of rescission.
In addition to these two general affirmative defenses to liability
under sections 410(a) (1) and (2), there are two specific defenses
to liability provided for in section 410(a) (2) of the Uniform Act.
If the buyer knows of the untruth or omission to state a material
fact (the bases of liability under part (2) of section 410(a))
then according to the terms of the section he cannot base his re-
covery upon this provision.26  Thus, the buyer could not know of
the untruth, as discussed in the preceding paragraph, and still re-
cover if the shares did not make sufficient financial progress. How-
ever, what was said there still holds for the buyer who knows of a
violation of one of the seven enumerated sections of the act. Sec-
ond, section 410 (a) (2) provides that if the seller can show lack of
knowledge of or the impossibility of discovering the truth or omis-
sion if reasonable care had been exercised, he will not be liable un-
der the provisions of this section. 7
(3) Persons Liable Under Section 410.-Under the provisions
of subsection (a) of section 410 of the Uniform Act, any person
who offers or sells in violation of its provisions is liable under the
section. In addition, however, every person who controls a seller
liable under 410(a) is also liable according to section 410(b).28
Further, if the violator is a partnership or corporation or similar
business group, every partner, officer, or director and every em-
ployee of such a seller, who materially aids such seller is liable joint-
ly and severally with and to the same extent as the seller unless
these persons can also make out the same defenses as specified in
the above section. 9
2 6 Section 410 (a) (2) provides as follows:
(a) Any person who . . . (2) offers or sells a security by means of any un-
true statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the
untruth or omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known,
of the untruth or omission ....
It at first appears that this provision is based upon reliance; however, the draftsmen's
comment states that the "'by means of clause' ... is not intended as a requirement that
the buyer prove -reliance on the untrue statement or the omission. He must show only
that he did not know of it."
27 For the text of this provision, see note 26 supra.
28 Section 410 (b) includes both direct and indirect control.
2 9 The one defense specified in this section is that the non-seller is not liable if he
sustains the burden of proof "that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is
1178
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It is not clear whether the use of the word "seller" in section
410 (b) was meant to exclude persons who materially aid violating
offerors or whether this was merely an oversight on the part of the
draftsmen. The liability defined in section 410(a) is phrased in
terms of "any person who offers or sells" in violation of the provi-
sions of that section. Section 410 (b) could easily have been phrased
in similar' terms if the draftsmen had intended to include persons who
aid violating offerors; the section could state that "every person who
directly or indirectly controls a person liable under subsection (a)
is also liable." Neither the official comment nor the draftsmen's
comment makes any reference to this word change. It is funda-
mental in statutory interpretation that where different words are
used, it is presumed that a different meaning was intended. Yet
it is hard to believe, in view of the underlying purpose of includ-
ing offerors within the provision of section 410(a), that the use
of the word "seller" was intended to exclude from the coverage of
section 410(b), persons who materially aid or control a violating
offeror. Under such an interpretation, in the case where an offer
is made in violation of the provisions of section 410 (a), but the vio-
lation is corrected before the sale is made, persons who control or
materially aid in the transaction would not be liable, even though
there is a good chance that the buyer could have been damaged by
the violative offer. It would be surprising if this were the intent of
the draftsmen.
(4) Waiver Provisions.-The Uniform Securities Act provides
simply that provisions by which a waiver of liability is attempted
are void.3" Waiver provisions of this nature could be found only
in the statutes which resembled closely the Uniform Act.
B. The Ohio Securities Act
Ohio has not adopted the Uniform Securities Act provisions on
civil liability. It would appear that Ohio has not adopted any part
of the Uniform Act; however, as to the provisions other than civil
liabilities, other sections of this symposium should be consulted.
The sixth and final draft of the proposed Ohio Securities Act3' did
alleged to exist." UNIFORM ACT § 410 (b). However, by virtue of the fact that lia-
bility under this section is dependent upon the liability of the violator, if any of the
defenses to liability under § 410(a) can be established, it will effectively preclude
liability under this section.
30 UNIFORM AcT § 410 (g).
31 See the Report of Ohio State Bar Association Committee on Corporation Law and
Committee on Blue Sky Law in 1 OHIO BAR No. 42 (1929).
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not contain civil liability provisions such as the present act contains.
The only provision pertaining to civil liabilities was section 38 of
the final draft which simply provided as follows: "This Act shall
create no new civil liabilities nor limit or restrict common law lia-
bilities for deception or fraud.""2  The committee comments indi-
cated rather clearly that it was the opinion of the drafters that the
proposed Ohio Securities Act did not and should not provide addi-
tional express liabilities. Their comments stated:
It is not the function of a Blue Sky Law either to limit, in-
crease or otherwise affect the civil liabilities for fraud established
by general law.... The law of fraud and the civil liabilities which
attach thereto are so clearly established in the law that it is be-
lieved that the courts will have no more difficulty in the future
than they have had in the past to attach civil liabilities to persons
who are found to have engaged in acts, practices or transactions
which are fraudulent under the General Code or which are so de-
fined by this act.33
Whether the legislature agreed with this statement of policy by the
drafters cannot be determined with any reliability because of the
absence of legislative history in Ohio. The only source from which
legislative intent can be determined or estimated is the wording
of the statutes taken against the backdrop of the legislative pattern
into which the particular language in question is placed. In the
case of the Ohio Securities Act of 1929, the legislature did add ex-
press civil liability provisions. The legislature added a section deal-
ing with the civil liability of a seller for fraud, 4 and another section
covering the civil liability of an adviser. 5 The voidabiity remedy
for purchasers was added later. 6 These provisions are substantially
the same today as they were when enacted."
(1) Civil Liability of Seller for Fraud.-Section 1707.41 pro-
vides for civil liability of a very limited nature where there has been
a material misrepresentation. Attesting to the fact that this section
provides very limited liability is the fact that there have been no
reported cases which have been brought directly under the section.
(a) Acts Leading to Liability.-Section 1707.41 proscribes the
offering of any security for sale by means of a written or printed
32 Id. at 88.
33 ibid.
34 113 Ohio Laws 242 (1929).
35 113 Ohio Laws 243 (1929).
36 117 Ohio Laws H.794 (1938). For a discussion of the Ohio voidability remedy
see Note, supra note 9.
37 For the present provisions see OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.41, .42, .43.
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circular, prospectus, or advertisement, which contains a material
statement which is false."8 Any person either offering a security for
sale or receiving the profits therefrom shall be liable "to any per-
son who purchased such security relying on such circular, prospectus,
or advertisement, for the loss or damage sustained by such relying
person by reason of the falsity of any material statement contained
therein." 9 It should be noted that this section does not cover oral
misrepresentations.
(b) Persons Liable Under Section 1707.41.-There are two
classes of persons who may incur liability under this section: "any
person who . . . offers any security for sale" and any person who
"receives the profits accruing from such sale."4  Thus, in the nor-
mal situation, this would include both the salesman and the broker-
dealer of securities. In addition to this, however, the statute makes
very specific provision for the liability of a corporation when it is
the party making the sale. The section provides that whenever a
corporation is so liable, then each director of the corporation is
"likewise" liable.4 Presumably, "likewise" liable means to the full
extent of liability, for the section later provides that a director against
whom a judgment was so obtained shall be subrogated to the rights
of the plaintiff against the corporation and shall have the right
of contribution against his fellow directors who would have been
individually liable under the section.
(c) Defenses to Liability Under Section 1707.41.-The liabili-
ties contained in this section will not be imposed if the person who
receives the profits or the offeror establishes that "he had no knowl-
edge of the publication thereof prior to the transaction complained
of, or had just and reasonable grounds to believe such statement to
be true."' It is further provided, however, that "lack of reasonable
diligence in ascertaining the fact of such publication or the falsity
of any statement contained in it shall be deemed knowledge of such
publication and of the falsity of any untrue statement in it."43 There
have been no cases reported under this statute indicating what is
meant by "reasonable diligence."
In addition to this defense, it can presumably be shown by way
380 1OO REv. CODE § 1707.41.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Note that the italicized wording obviates the confusion resulting from the use of
the word "seller" in § 410(b) of the Uniform Act. See discussion.p. 1179 supra.
42 OHio REv. CODE § 1707.41.
3 Ibid.
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of defense that there was no reliance by the buyer on the publication
complained of. As was noted above, one of the elements of the
liability provided for under this section is that the violator is liable
"to any person who purchased such security relying on such
circular . . .,,"
Non-materiality is also a defense to an action based on section
1707.41. In order to make out liability, the plaintiff must show
that he was damaged by reason of the falsity of any material state-
ment contained in the written matter.45
There is one further defense available to directors. The second
paragraph of section 1707.41 provides that an action brought
against a director, based upon this section, must be brought within
"two years after the purchase of securities by the person so damaged
or after the payment of the judgment for which contribution is
sought."4 Nothing is said, however, in regard to the time within
which any action must be brought against a non-director who vio-
lates this section. No cases have been reported which indicate
that this was an intentional omission and that another statutory
period of limitation is to be applied. That the general statute of
limitations for fraud is to govern actions against non-directors is
the opinion held by some securities practitioners." Thus, as to
non-directors, the statute of limitations would be four years.48 If
Ohio maintained an official legislative history, perhaps this ques-
tion would not have to be left to speculation.
(2) Civil Liability of Advisers.-The Ohio Securities Act pro-
vides in section 1707.42 for the liability of persons less directly con-
nected with the securities transaction than those described immedi-
ately above:
Whoever, with intent to secure financial gain to himself, advises
and procures any person to purchase any security, and receives any
commission or reward for such advice or services without disclos-
ing to the purchaser the fact of his agency or his interest in such
sales, shall be liable to such purchaser for the amount of such pur-
chaser's damage thereby, upon tender of such security to, and suit
441bid.
45 The only Ohio example of a judicial consideration of what constitutes a material
misrepresentation in the securities field was a case decided under a statute which was
repealed by the 1929 Ohio Securities Act. See Citizens Banking & Savings Co. v. Spitzer,
Rorick & Co., 65 Ohio App. 309, 29 N.E.2d 892 (1938).
46 OHio REv. CODE § 1707.41.
47Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Securities, Ohio Division of Securities to
the Author, July 11, 1966.
4 8 Oro REv. CODE § 2305.09.
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brought against, such adviser, by such purchaser. No such suit
shall be brought more than one year subsequent to such purchase.48
That the exact scope, meaning, and intent of this section is not dear
will be seen below.
(a) Acts Leading to Liability.-Failure to disclose an agency
or interest is the central concern of section 1707.42. Under the
express language of this section, if a transaction is legal in every
respect, but an agent or other person with an interest in the sale was
responsible for inducing or procuring the purchaser to buy the se-
curities and he receives "any commission or reward" for such advice
without disclosing his agency or interest to the purchaser, apparently
the purchaser may maintain an action for the amount of his damage
"thereby." Thus, liability is based upon five elements: (i)intent
to secure financial gain; (ii) advising and procuring a person to
purchase a security; (iii) the receipt of a commission or reward for
the giving of the advise; (iv) failure to disclose the agency or in-
terest to the purchaser; and (v) damage to the purchaser "thereby."
The last element, damage "thereby," would seem to be a very
difficult element to establish. Certainly the purchaser was not dam-
aged merely by the fact that he did not know of the undisclosed
agency or interest in the transaction. About the only situation in
which it could truly be said that the purchaser was damaged "there-
by" would be one in which the purchaser maintains that he would
not have bought the security in question but for his reliance on what
he thought was the disinterestd advice of the agent. If the buyer
must, in fact, meet this difficult "but for" burden of proof, such a
test makes this section less useful to an injured purchaser than it at
first appears.
(b) Persons Liable Under Section 1707.42.-rThe language of
this section would seem to encompass not only agents and salesmen
of the seller but also persons who have a pecuniary interest in the
effectuation of the sale in question. The section says "whoever...
advises and procures... and receives any commission or reward for
such advice or services.. ." shall be liable.5" Whether the relation-
ship of the adviser or procurer is found to be one of agency does not
seem to be of central importance for the section makes the person
liable for failure to disclose "the fact of his agency or his interest
in such sales." If a person has any interest in the outcome of a sales
negotiation by way of commission or reward and he, with intent to
49 OHio REv. CODE § 1707.42.
50 Ibid.
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gain financially, procures the purchaser without informing him of
his interest, he might be held liable under this section.
(c) Defenses to Liability Under Section 1707.42.-As noted
above, there are five elements which must be established before a
recovery will be awarded under this section." By way of de-
fense, the proof that any one of these elements is lacking would
negative liability under this section. In addition to this, the af-
firmative defense of the statute of limitations would of course be
available. Section 1707.42 provides that a suit under this section
must be brought within one year subsequent to the purchase.
(3) Liability for Violations of Administrative Action.-It is
expressly provided in the act that there are to be no civil liabilities
for the failure to comply with orders, requirements, rules, or regula-
tions made by the Division of Securities. " This restriction on civil
liability would most directly affect the liabilities under the void-
ability provision which incorporates by reference all the other sec-
tions of the Ohio Securities Act. There are many regulations and
rulings pertaining to registration of dealers and securities but viola-
tions of these would not result in liability under the voidability sec-
tion unless the section of the act upon which the regulations were
based also contained the language upon which liability was being
contended.
C. Liability Provisions in Other States not Having the Uniform
Securities Act
Excluding Ohio, there are twenty-four states which have some
provision for express civil liabilities" but which do not follow the
scheme of the Uniform Securities Act.54 Although it would be be-
yond the limited scope of this article to examine in detail the liabil-
ity provisions in each of these states, some of the more interesting
and unique of these will be briefly treated here.
Florida, for example, provides in addition to voidability,55 that
the laws of the United States are to govern the remedies of pur-
51 See discussion supra p. 1183.
5 2 0no REV. CODE § 1707A0.
5 3 Arizona, California, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont, West Virginia. In addition to these seventeen states, there are seven states
which make voidability the exclusive remedy and thus are beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle: Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Wisconsin.
54 For the states following the Uniform Act, see note 15 supra.
55 Voidability is covered in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21 (1962).
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chasers.5" Thus, Florida has apparently authorized a state cause of
action for the liabilities specified in the federal securities acts, an
action which could prove helpful where federal jurisdiction could
not be obtained.57
In Minnesota, the only provision for civil liability, other than
the bonding section,5" is found in the section defining the period of
limitations within which an action upon a sale of securities must be
brought. 9 The acts leading to liability are all associated with regis-
tration of the security or the dealer.
Missouri enacted the following unique provision:
Any person interested in securities sold in violation of any
provision of this chapter may maintain in the name of the issuer
an action at law or in equity for the use of the issuer against the
solicitor, agent, or broker to recover all moneys in excess of twenty
per cent of the proceeds... and not turned into the treasury of the
issuer.60
It appears from this provision that if a sale violates the provisions
of the Missouri Code, the seller or solicitor may not take more than
twenty per cent of the proceeds as a commission. Apparently, if
the sale does not violate any provisions, then there is no limit on
the amount of the proceeds that may be retained by the seller or
solicitor.
In addition to a voidability provision, West Virginia provides
for additional liability where the sale was made to a bank employee
or officer and a copy of the bill, confirmation, or order was not sent.
Such a failure will render the salesman or dealer liable to the bank,
trust company, or savings institution involved.01
II. xPREss REMEDIES UNDER STATE BLUE SKY LAws
A. The Uniform Securities Act
The Uniform Act provides different remedies for an injured pur-
chaser depending upon whether the security transferred in the al-
56 &A. STAT. ANN. § 517.23 (1962).
57 For example, § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 771 (1964) requires that the offer or sale be "by the use of any means or in-
struments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails .... " See also 3 Loss, SEcURiTIs REGULATION 1624 (1961).
58
MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 80.13 (Supp. 1965).
59 "In any suit... civil or criminal.., it shall not be necessary to negative any of
the exemptions or exceptions provided by sections 80.05 to 80.27. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 80.25 (1946).
60 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.250 (1952).
61W. VA. CODE ANN. 5 3273(12) (Supp. 1965).
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legedly illegal sale is still in his possession. If it is, then his remedy
is rescission under the voidability provision of the Uniform Act62
If the plaintiff has not retained the security to the time of the ac-
tion, his remedy is for damages which are equal to the amount that
would have been recoverable upon tender of the security less the
value of the security when sold plus six per cent interest on the dif-
ference from the date of disposition.63 The amount that would be
recoverable upon tender is the consideration paid plus six per cent
interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees less any income derived
from the security.6" These are the damages specified for any liabil-
ity arising under section 410 of the Uniform Act.
It seems clear from the above provisions that if the complaining
purchaser still owns the security, he has no choice as to his remedy.
He must seek rescission. Only if he has disposed of the security
does the damage formula apply. It could be argued that even the
damage remedy provided by section 410 is a voidability provision
in that the effect of the damage formula is to put the plaintiff in
exactly the same position he would have been in had he not disposed
of the security.6" Technically speaking, however, it seems doubtful
whether this should be classified as a voidability section merely be-
cause the damage formula effects a result which is identical, or
nearly so, to that which would result in a rescission action.
Recovery may be had against the bond provided for in section
202 (e) of the Uniform Act. Section 202 (e) states that the bond
shall be used to satisfy any suit brought under section 410 of the
act.66
One other point is worthy of mention. Under the Uniform Act,
62 UNIFoRM ACT § 410(a).
63 Ibid. Section 410(a) states in pertinent part:
Any person who . . . [commits the specified violations] is liable to the
person buying the security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity
to recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at six
percent per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys'
fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender
of the security and any income received on it, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security. Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon
a tender less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and in-
terest at six percent per year from the date of disposition. (Emphasis added.)
64 Ibid.
65 Even the official comment to § 410 (a) acknowledges this. It says that the mea-
sure of damages, when the injured party cannot tender the securities upon which his ac-
tion is based, "is designed to be the substantial equivalent of rescission." This official
comment is found in Loss & CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 390 (1958).
66 UNIFoRM ACT § 202 (e). The details of this bond provision are discussed infra.
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the cause of action under section 410 survives the death of either
the plaintiff or the defendant.67
B. The Ohio Securities Act
Exactly what remedies are specified by the language of the Ohio
act is not dear. Sections 1707.41 to 1707.43 each provide civil
liabilities, but only section 1707.43 specifically provides a remedy
for the injured purchaser. 8 Section 1707.41, for example, dealing
with fraud in printed circulars or advertisements, provides that the
offeror or other person profiting from the proscribed sale shall be
liable "for the loss or damage sustained."6" This is not very help-
ful. Section 1707.42 provides that the agent or adviser shall be
liable "for the amount of such purchaser's damage thereby, upon
tender of such security.... ." There is no damage formula provided;
however, since tender of the security is a prerequisite to recovery, it
would seem that the purchaser might recover the total purchase
price. Nothing is said about what remedy is available under sec-
tion 1707.42 where the purchaser no longer owns the security and
therefore cannot make tender. Consider further that the language
of section 1707.43 purports to cover sales or contracts made in vio-
lation of the above section as well as section 1707.42, dealing with
the civil liability of advisers. Section 1707.43 states:
Every sale or contract for sale made in violation of sections
1707.01 to 1707.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code, is voidable at
the election of the purchaser ... 70
If the italicized language is read strictly, then all violations of the
act can be remedied by resort to section 1707.43. The absence of
damage formulas in sections 1707.41 and 1707.42 might be in-
terpreted as indicating that the legislature intended the remedies
in section 1707.43 to govern in all cases of civil liability. This
interpretation could be difficult to sustain, however, in view of the
fact that both section 1707.41 and section 1707.42 provide their
own statute of limitations and that sections 1707.42 and 1707.43
require tender whereas section 1707.41 does not. If it is held that
sections 1707.41 and 1707.42 do provide remedies independent of
6 7 UNIFORM Acr § 410 (d).
68 The remedy provided is rescission. For a discussion of this remedy, see Note,
Voidability Provisions Uider State Blue Sky Laws, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 1148 (1966).
6 90 mo Rsv. CODE 5 1707.41.
7 0 OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.43. (Emphasis added.)
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1707.43, then presumably the common law damage formulas would
be applied."
C. Remedies Provided in Other States
Excluding Delaware, which has no blue sky statute, and the
four additional states which have no civil liability provisions,7 forty-
one states provide the remedy of rescission in varying degrees.73
Four states do not provide for rescission for any violation 4 and two
of these states limit the remedy available to an action on the bond
required of the specified persons dealing in securities.75 Of the
forty-one states providing for voidability, seven states seem to make
this remedy exclusive,76 while the other thirty-four states provide
for voidability along with another remedy, most often an action on
the bond for the damage sustained by virtue of the proscribed ac-
tivity.77
Generally speaking, in states that have not adopted the civil
liabilities of the Uniform Securities Act, the measure of damages is
not specified in the statutes. In Arizona, for example, the amount
71 See generally, McCORMIcK, LAW OF DAMAGES 62-69 (1935).
72 Idaho, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island.
73 For a listing of these states, see note 7 supra.
74 Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, South Dakota.
7 5 Maine, South Dakota. See the discussion of bond provisions at pp. 1189-93 supra.
76 GA. CODE ANN. § 97-114 (Supp. 1965); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 199-16 (Supp.
1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.13 (Smith-Hurd 1965); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 51:715 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-22 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 10-
04-17 (1960); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 189.18 (1957).
77 The states and the statutory sections providing for the remedy other than void-
ability are as follows: ALA. CODE tit. 53, §§ 29(c), 45(a) (Supp. 1963); ALASKA
STAT. § 45.55.220(a) (1962); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943, 44-2001 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(a) (1966); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25703, 26100; COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-21 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36 -312a (1960);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.12-.14, .23 (1962); IND. STAT. ANN. 5 25-873(e) (Supp.
1965); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 502.18 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268(a)
(1964); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.330(3) (c), 292.480(1) (1963); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 32A, § 34(a) (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 110A, 5 18 (1947); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 19.776 (410)(a) (Supp. 1965); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5371 (Supp.
1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.250 (1952); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2022(1)
(Supp. 1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-321 (1958); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90,200(1)
(Supp. 1963); N. J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-19(a) (Supp. 1965); N. M. STAT. ANN. §
48-18-20.6 (Supp. 1965); OHiO REv. CODE 5 1707.41, .42; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71,
§ 408(a) (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59-310 (1961); S. C. CODE ANN. § 62-309
(1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1624 (A) (14) (1964); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 581-33 (1964); UTAH. CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(1) (Supp. 1965); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 9, 5 4216 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(a) (1964); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. 5 21.20.430(1) (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3273 (12) (Supp.
1965); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17.117.22(a) (1965). Maine and South Dakota were
omitted from this listing because they have a bond remedy only.
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that can be recovered under the voidability remedy is specified, but
the amount of damages that can be recovered is not specified."
III. BOND PROVISIONS IN STATE BLUE SKY LAWS
It is difficult to classify bond provisions in general as liability
provisions. Some of the bond statutes do not actually create any
new liabilities but rather merely provide a fund out of which judg-
ments based on other liability provisions may be satisfied. Of the
thirty-two states which have bond provisions in their securities
statutes,79 eighteen merely create a fund out of which liabilities may
be paid,8" while the other fourteen appear to create liabilities inde-
pendent of any other section of the securities law.8" Before entering
into a discussion of this matter, it might be helpful to consider the
general pattern of bonding provisions in the states.
A. Persons Required to Obtain Bond
In almost all states having bond provisions, broker-dealers
either are or may be required to obtain a bond if the net worth or
minimum capital of such dealership is below a certain specified
minimum.82 In addition, other states require agents and investment
7 8 
IZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2001 (1956).
79The states having no bond provisions in their securities laws are Connecticut,
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio (provides by regulation DS-4), Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. Delaware does not have a securities
law.
80AASKA STAT. § 45.55.040 (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1238(e) (1966);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-3(5) (1963); HAWAI REV. LAWS § 199-11 (c)
(Supp. 1961); IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-863(b) (Supp. 1965); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
17-1254 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 16e (1957); MICH. STAT. ANN.
S 19.776 (202) (e) (Supp. 1965); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 80.13 (Supp. 1965); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 409.140 (Supp. 1965); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-2006(2) (Supp.
1965); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.130(6) (Supp. 1963); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-10(e)
(Supp. 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-10 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
71, § 202(e) (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-111 (1962); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-4
(5) (Supp. 1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-505 (1964).
81 AL. CODE tit. 53, § 29(c) (Supp. 1963); ARaz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943
(1956); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25703; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.12-.14 (1962); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 502.11 (Supp. 1965); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.330(3) (c) (1963);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 852 (1965); Miss. CODE ANN. S 5371 (Supp. 1964);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-321 (1958); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-20.6 (Supp. 1965);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 59-310 (1961); S.D. CODE § 55.1912 (Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-1624 (A) (14) (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4216 (1959).
8-This minimum net worth or stated capital varies from $10,000 in many states
to $100,000 in Michigan.
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advisers to obtain bonds8' or, in the alternative, allow the dealers
to take out blanket bonds to cover all of the salesmen or advisers
associated with them.84 The Uniform Securities Act, for example,
states that the administrator may require broker-dealers, agents, and
investment advisers to obtain bonding from a surety, except that
where the net capital of the agency or dealership making applica-
tion for registration is in excess of 25,000 dollars, no bond may be
required.85 Many states have one or another variation of this
scheme, but the provisions are so varied that they escape meaningful
classification or categorization."6 One of the more exceptional pro-
visions is that of Arkansas which provides that the Commissioner
shall require a bond for dealers and agents;8" however, the statute
provides more exceptions than the typical statute.88 Oregon states
that a dealer must obtain a bond.89 Hawaii, on the other hand, pro-
vides that no bond need be obtained for applicants who are mem-
bers of recognized stock or bond exchanges which have been in ex-
istence since 1926."0
B. Amount of the Bond
There is also significant variation as to the amount of the bond
that is required or may be required. Michigan leads the list of
states by providing that the bond may run as high as 100,000 dol-
lars.9 Three of the more typical bond amounts are 5,000, 10,000,
and 25,000 dollars.92 In Iowa, no amount is specified in the bond
83 See, e.g., Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado. For the relevant code sections, see notes
77 and 78 supra.
84See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.13 (Supp. 1965).
8 5 UNIFoRM AcT §202 (e).
8 6 Even the states which have adopted the Uniform Act have not followed its bond
section exactly.
87ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1238(e) (1966).
88 The statute exempts "broker-dealers dealing exclusively in municipal or govern-
ment securities; broker-dealers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
who are also members of the National Association of Securities Dealers, or their agents
registered with the National Association of Securities Dealers; or investment advisers
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission." Ibid.
89 Opm REv. STAT. § 59-310 (1961).
90 HAwAII REv. LAws § 199-11(C) (Supp. 1961).
91MiC-. STAT. ANN. § 19.776 (202) (e) (Supp. 1965).
92See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1254 (Supp. 1965) ($5,000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 292.330(3) (c) (1963) (up to $10,000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
852 (1965) (up to $10,000); Mo. ANN. STAT. 5 409.140 (Supp. 1965) ($5,000);




statute. 3  The Uniform Securities Act provides that the bond may
reach a maximum of 10,000 dollars and that cash or securities shall
be accepted in lieu of the bond.9" Here, as in the case of persons
covered, the individual schemes of the states defy meaningful dassi-
fication so the reader is advised to consult the individual provisions
of the states in which he has an interest.
C. Statutes of Limitations for Actions on the Bond
Most of the bonding statutes provide that an action brought
against the bond must be commenced within two years after the sale
or other act upon which it is based.95 At least one state provides for
a one year statute of limitations 6 and other states do not provide
any period of limitation in the bonding statute.97
D. Liability on the Bond
As was previously mentioned, in fourteen states, the bonding
provisions appear to create or authorize liabilities additional to those
contained in the other provisions of the act." At first glance, it
might appear that the Uniform Securities Act bonding section cre-
ates new liabilities: "Every bond shall provide for suit thereon by
any person who has a cause of action under section 410 [the civil
liabilities sectioni and, if the [administrator] by rule or order re-
quires, by any person who has a cause of action not arising under
this act."9  No new civil liabilities are created by this section.
Rather, the administrator is authorized to allow by rule or order that
93
IowA CODE ANN. 5 502.11 (Supp. 1965).
94 UNIFORM ACT § 202 (e).
9 5 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1238(e) (1966); CAL. CoP. CODE § 25703.
96 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.15 (1962).
97See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1943 (1956); HAWAHI Rm. LAWS § 199-
11(c) (Supp. 1961); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1254 (Supp. 1965); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 852 (1964); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 80.13 (Supp. 1965); MIss. CODE
ANN. 5 5371 (Supp. 1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.140 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 81-321 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59-310 (1961); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§ 4216 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-505 (1964). This fact is not unusual where
the bond is merely a fund out of which a judgment is paid, for normally the statute
of limitations is a part of the remedy section. However, confusion could arise where
bond sections which create liabilities and remedies independent of the other civil liabil-
ity provisions, do not contain a separate limitations period for this separate remedy.
This is the case with Arizona, Maine, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oregon, and Vermont.
See the statutory sections cited above.
98 See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
99 UNIFoRM Acr § 202(e).
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non-statutory causes of action may be satisfied out of the bond. Con-
trast this with the following language:
conditioned upon a strict compliance with the provisions of this
chapter, which bond shall be approved by and filed with the Com-
mission. Any person or persons injured by a violation of the
conditions of such bond or the Attorney General may bring an
action in the name of the state on said bond .... 10
This is the bonding provision of South Dakota and seems to create
new liabilities, namely, for the noncompliance with the conditions
of the bond. It should be noted, however, that South Dakota does
not have any other express liability provisions. The more ambigu-
ous situation is where the statute in question does have a liabilities
section and has a bond section which could be read as creating new
liabilities. Consider, for example, the following language in the
Alabama Code:
Said bond ... shall be conditioned upon the faithful accounting of
all moneys and securities of another and for the payment of anyjudgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction against
such dealer or agent of such dealer, one or both, in any action at
law or suit in equity in Alabama of any security. Any original
purchaser of securities from or through any such registered dealer
or other person damaged by any breach in the conditions of said
bond shall have a right of action upon said bond for the damage
suffered thereby.'0'
Alabama has a liabilities provision closely analogous to section 410
of the Uniform Securities Act.1
02
The official comments to section 202(e) of the Uniform Se-
curities Act, the bond provision, state that it is "designed to avoid
the frequently ambiguous provisions concerning who may sue on
the bond by making those conditions of any required bond coter-
minous with the liability provisions of § 410 so far as causes of ac-
tion under the Act are concerned.' 3  Thus, the only question re-
maining under the Uniform Act's bond provision is what suits the
administrator may allow for non-statutory causes of action. 0 4 How-
ever, under Alabama's bond section, it appears that the italicized
language could create liabilities not covered by its civil liabilities
100 S.D. CODE § 55.1912 (Supp. 1960).
101Ail. CODE tit. 53, § 29(c) (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
102 Only the dealer is covered by the Alabama bond section. Also the section states
that the bond is payable to the state and is subject to actions for fraud or for a breach of
the conditions of the bond. Otherwise the sections are the same.
103 See the official comment in Loss & CowETr, BLUE SKY LAw 267 (1958).
104 See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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section. The only way to make this determination is to compare
the bond conditions to the violations defined in the liabilities section
of the act. If the conditions of the bond include more than the
liabilities section, obviously the bond section would create additional
liability.
Thus, it can be seen that as to liability on the bond, there are
three groups of states involved: those whose bond provisions pro-
vide the only civil liability provision of the securities law, those
patterned after the Uniform Act where the conditions of the bond
are made co-extensive with the liability provisions in the rest of the
securities act, and those states where there appear to be liability pro-
visions both in the bond section and in another section of the act.
In the latter group, confusion may arise as to exactly who is entitled
to sue on the bond.
IV. IMPLIED LIABILITIES UNDER STATE
BLUE SKY LAWS
The doctrine of implied liability could be described as the
doctrine whereby statutory duties, which carry only express criminal
or administrative sanctions, give rise to implied civil remedies to
private parties who are injured by a breach of the stated duty."0 5
Much has been written on the doctrine and on its applicability un-
der the federal securities laws; 106 therefore, there will be no discus-
sion in depth here on the fundamentals of that doctrine. However,
the question to be considered herein is whether the doctrine of im-
plied liability has been applied to state blue sky laws, and if so, to
what extent.
Before discussing the present status of the doctrine of implied
liability under state blue sky laws, one word of caution should be
heeded. Implied liabilities and common law liabilities are not the
same. Implied liabilities arise through a breach of express statutory
directives, or perhaps through a breach of rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder. Common law liabilities exist irrespective
of the statutory language, unless, of course, the statute specifically
provides that the statutory liabilities are intended to replace and
entirely supersede common law liabilities.
10 5 See generally 2 Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULAT[ON 932-43 (1961).
106 See, e.g., Shipman, Two Current Questions Concerning Implied Private Rights
of Action Under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administrative Agency to Negate;,
Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. RES. L. RBv. 925
(1966).
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A. Implied Liabilities Under the Uniform Securities Act
The civil liabilities section of the Uniform Act provides that
legal and equitable actions existing at common law are preserved,
but that no liabilities beyond those set out in sections 410"07 and
202 (e)... are created by the act. °9 It is entirely clear that the
draftsmen of the Uniform Act intended that the doctrine of implied
liabilities should not be applied under the act. The official com-
ment to section 410 (h) states as follows:
The mere presence of certain specific liability provisions in a
statute is no assurance that other liabilities will not be implied by
the courts under the doctrine which creates a common-law tort ac-
tion for violation of certain criminal statutes .... Notwithstanding
the presence of several specific liability provisions in each of the
several SEC statutes, the federal courts have implied a civil cause
of action by a defrauded seller against the buyer under SEC Rule
X-10B-5 [now 240.10b-5]. . . .The "but" clause in § 410(h) is
designed to assure that no comparable development is based on
violation of § 101 of this Act [fraudulent and other prohibited
practices] .110
Thus, it is certain that the doctrine of implied liabilities was to have
no application under the Uniform Securities Act, if the intent of
the draftsmen is to be given weight. It is interesting to note, how-
ever, that some of the states which have adopted the Uniform Act
have not adopted the "but" clause of section 410(h)."'
B. Implied Liabilities Under the Ohio Securities Act
Although Ohio has not adopted the Uniform Securities Act, it
does have a statutory provision resembling the "no new liabilities"
clause of the Uniform Act. It provides as follows:
Sections 1707.01 to 1707.45, inclusive, of the Revised Code
create no new civil liabilities, and do not limit or restrict common
law liabilities for deception or fraud other than as specified in sec-
tions 1707A1, 1707.42, and 1707A3 of the Revised Code .... 112
There have been no cases found which deal with the meaning of
this section. It is doubtful that the fact that it resembles the pro-
vision of the Uniform Act will be of any help, for Ohio has not
107 See notes 16-24 supra and accompanying text.
108 See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
109 UNIFORM AcT § 410(h).
110 The official comment is found in Loss & COWETr, op. cit. supra note 65 at 395.
(Emphasis added.)
111 Alabama, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Texas, Virginia, and Washington, which
have adopted the Uniform Act, have not adopted the "but" clause of section 410 (h).
-12 Ofuo REv. CODE § 1707.40.
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adopted that act. Moreover, this provision has been included in the
Ohio statutes since the present securities law was enacted in 1929.113
Thus, the legislature could hardly be said to have adopted the subse-
quent reasoning or rationale of the draftsmen of the Uniform Act.
It is further interesting to note that the expressed view of the
drafters of the present Ohio Securities Act seems to indicate an ex-
press ratification of the doctrine of implied liability. Consider the
following language taken from the Report of the Ohio State Bar
Association Committee on Corporation Law and Committee on
Blue Sky Law:
A Blue Sky Law is a police measure and if it sought to set up new
and additional liabilities for fraud it would be found either that the
courts, in interpreting the statute, would ignore the attempt to re-
write the law of fraud or would frequently find themselves in the
position of being obliged to attach a civil liability to persons who
were not guilty of any act other than a technical non-compliance
with the statute. The law of fraud and the civil liabilities which
attach thereto are so dearly established in the law that it is believed
that the courts will have no more difficulty in the future than they
have had in the past to attach civil liabilities to persons who are
found to have engaged in acts, practices or transactions which are
fraudulent under the General Code or which are so defined by
this Act."4
From the above language it appears that the draftsmen of the
Ohio Securities Act envisioned an act without express civil liabilities
and remedies, the civil enforcement of which would be achieved by
the courts attaching "civil liabilities to persons who are found to
have engaged in acts, practices or transactions which are fraudulent
under the General Code or which are so defined by this act." This
is implied civil liability.
The significance of this language in the committee report is
probably minimal because of the fact that the Ohio Legislature re-
fused to follow the committee recommendation in this regard and
instead did provide express civil liabilities under the Ohio Act."5
It might be argued that such a specific enumeration of civil liability
indicates a legislative intent that the stated remedies are to be the
exclusive ones. On the other hand, the draftsmen of the Uniform
Act argued that the experience under the federal statutes is dear
support for the proposition that a specific enumeration of civil
liabilities and remedies will not deter the courts from implying addi-
11 113 Ohio Laws 216, 245 (1929).
114 Report of Ohio State Bar Association Committee on Corporation Law and Com-
mittee on Blue Sky Law in 1 OmIo BAR No. 42, at 88 (1929). (Emphasis added.)
115 See notes 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
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tional civil liabilities for the breach of statutory duties."' And dis-
covering legislative intent in Ohio is not made easier by the fact
that there is no recorded legislative history in Ohio. Thus, one is
left to glean legislative intent from the statutory language itself and
the pattern of the regulatory scheme of which the specific language
is but one part. Therefore, it is difficult to predict whether the doc-
trine of implied liability will be applied to the Ohio Securities Act."'
C. Implied Liabilities in Other States
Among the states which have adopted major portions of the
Uniform Securities Act," 8 seven states have omitted the "no new
liabilities" clause of section 410 (h) of the final draft."' It would
seem that only two reasonable inferences can be drawn from the
omission of the clause: either the legislatures of these states did not
wish to take a position on this matter, or the legislatures meant to
allow application of the doctrine of implied liabilities.
Of the states which have not adopted the Uniform Act to any
considerable extent, only two states have enacted language similar
to that of the "no new liabilities" clause of section 410 (h).12° In
addition, the Rhode Island statutes mention that alternative reme-
dies shall be unimpaired but the statutes say nothing about the
creation or prohibition of civil liabilities. 2' Since the Rhode Island
securities act contains no express civil liabilities, it is likely that the
doctrine of implied liabilities will be applied.
Finally, it is interesting that only one state expressly adopts the
doctrine of implied liabilities in its securities law. Nebraska statutes
provide that new liabilities may be provided by implication. 22
V. CONCLUSION
The civil liability provisions of the non-Uniform Act states defy
precise classification. Almost all have some voidability provision
116 Such was the case under § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 84, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1964), even though one part of § 12 contained a spedfic
enumeration.
117 The Deputy Commissioner of Securities, Ohio Division of Securities, stated that
the Division would be guided by the draftsmen's comment, reprinted in part in the
text at note 114. Letter from Deputy Commissioner of Securities, Ohio Division of
Securities, to the Author, July 11, 1966.
118 See the statutes listed at note 15 supra.
119The states are listed at note 111 supra.
1 20 0HIO REV. CODE § 1707.40; Wis. STAT. ANN. 5 189.18(7) (1957).
121 R.I. GEN. LAws. ANN. § 7-11-27 (1956).
12 2 NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-331 (1958).
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with seven states making this the exclusive remedy. Ohio also pro-
vides for voidabiity but in addition provides a civil remedy for
fraud and a remedy against advisers with an undisclosed interest in
the sale.
Most of the states have bond provisions, but these vary greatly
from state to state. Some of the states have created liability, addi-
tional to that specified in the civil liabilities section, for failure to
comply with the conditions of the bond, conditions which are not
necessarily co-extensive with the proscriptions of the civil liabilities
section.
Whether the doctrine of implied liabilities is to be applied un-
der state securities laws is far from clear. Under the Uniform Act,
the official comment to section 410(h) indicates that the drafters
intended that the doctrine was not to be applied. However, some
states have not adopted the "no new liabilities" language of section
410(h) of the Uniform Act.
Finally, most states expressly reserve common law remedies.
Thus, in states which do not provide express civil liabilities, injured
buyers, generally, should be able to rely on implied remedies and
common law remedies.
At present, purchasers of securities seem well protected under
most state blue sky laws. In some instances, they are too well pro-
tected, as where a purchaser may recover his purchase price or dam-
ages for a technical and non-material violation of the act when he
discovers within the period of the statute of limitations that his
acquisition has not fared as well as he had hoped. This preferred
position could be eliminated by restricting liability to cases where
the violation could have caused a material misunderstanding on
the part of the buyer and to cases where the liability is necessary to
enforce the registration provisions of the act.
The Uniform Act's civil liabilities and remedies are designed to
return an injured purchaser to his pre-purchase position. There
appears to be no attempt at punishment through civil liability. Al-
though it is difficult to predict the future rate of adoption of the
Uniform Act, if the present trend continues, it could become the
law in more than half the American jurisdictions within five years.
If uniformity of law among the states is a desirable end, then this
trend is to be applauded.
ROBERT L. MATIA
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